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The Specter of Violence that Haunts the 
UDHR: The Turn to Ethics and Expertise 
VASUKI NESIAH* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ratification of the Genocide Convention just a day before the 
ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is 
a potent reminder of how intimately the backdrop of war and mass 
atrocity haunts the UDHR and the mobilization of the human rights 
framework in post-conflict situations.  This paper focuses on human 
rights in the shadow of war by examining international interventions 
advancing rights through peace building and democracy promotion 
initiatives in post-conflict regimes.1  From Timor to Cambodia, 
Afghanistan to Liberia, Sierra Leone to Nepal, we see the role of the 
international community in ‗nation building‘ and peace processes, 
advancing rule of law and democracy promotion programs.  This 
paper does not examine the impact of the human rights regime on 
culture; rather, it examines the ‗culture‘2 of human rights inter-
ventions themselves and, in particular, interventions in post-war 
contexts.  I suggest that the backdrop of genocide, war, or other 
 
* Director of International Affairs and lecturer in international relations, Brown University. 
1. The specter of violence plays a key role in many areas of human rights.  For instance, 
contemporary discourse on Islam and women‘s rights in the human rights literature often 
foregrounds the threat of violence in ways that have shaped the trajectory of human rights 
interventions on that issue.  However, this paper is confined to a claim about the constitutive 
role of violence in defining rights promotion in the post-conflict world.  It does not discuss 
the role of violence in relation to human rights more generally. 
2. I use ―culture‖ to refer to a reading of certain symptomatic elements (in particular, the 
role of expertise and the role of ethics) in the assemblage of rules, norms, and practices that 
constitute this sub-field of human rights work. 
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forms of mass violence have been invoked and interpolated to 
develop a particular culture, or style of interventions regarding rights 
and democracy promotion, that is characterized by two related 
turns—the turn to ethics and the turn to expertise.  The specter of 
mass violence functions to legitimate and shape this style of inter-
vention at the expense of a closer interrogation of what is authorized 
in the name of rights in the shadow of war. 
The rest of this paper proceeds by first describing the work done 
by the representation of the violence of conflict and post-conflict 
societies.  The following sections describe the human rights and 
democracy promotion paradigm and flesh out the turn to expertise on 
the one hand, and ethics on the other.  I wrap up with some con-
cluding thoughts on the UDHR and the specter of mass violence that 
haunts rights within the history of international intervention.   
Illustrative references to the representation of violence in Sri 
Lanka and Sri Lanka‘s experience with the post-conflict industry 
emerge as a thread running through this paper.  From 2002 to 2006 a 
peace process facilitated by the Norwegian government produced a 
ceasefire that interrupted the war between the Government of Sri 
Lanka and the militant group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.  
That period saw the country flooded by human rights and democracy 
promotion initiatives that are key dimensions of the post-conflict 
interventions.  While this paper does not conduct a comprehensive 
case study of Sri Lanka, human rights and democracy promotion 
initiatives in the country recur as reference points in different sections 
of this paper.  
II. THE WORK OF VIOLENCE IN HAUNTING HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
Histories of the UDHR inevitably have as a foreground the 
historical setting in which it emerged.  In the wake of World War 
Two, the declaration was an affirmation of humanism in the wake of 
mass murder on an unprecedented scale.  Mass violence defines the 
threat to which human rights and democracy promotion interventions 
respond and also creates the normative and practical urgency that 
propels these interventions.   
For many, violence, human rights violations on the body, has a 
rapacious capacity to devour ―the political.‖  Violence is a thing 
apart, an uncontrolled and uncontrollable phenomenon that destroys 
the possibility of law, reason, and the realm of the political.  Mahmud 
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Mamdani argues that the modern political sensibility has a two-
pronged view of violence.  On the one hand, there is the violence of 
the French and American revolutions or of the World Wars that 
emerges as rational violence, violence that can be celebrated as the 
sacrifice of life for a higher cause.3  Here violence is seen as the 
engine of history, embedded into the story of progress.   
On the other hand, there is another dominant story about violence 
and this is the story of violence that is beyond explanation.  The 
internecine conflicts in Africa and South Asia are invariably placed in 
this category.4  The Sri Lankan author Michael Ondaatje describes 
the war in Sri Lanka, the very real history of violence of the 
insurgency against which his novel Anil’s Ghost is set, as something 
that can be likened to the random brutality of natural catastrophes: 
―Pompeii.  Laetoli.  Hiroshima.  Vesuvius.  Tectonic slips and brutal 
human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical 
lives.‖5  This violence defies a progress narrative and cannot be 
situated in a march to higher order principles that will redeem, rather 
than condemn, the brutality of conflict.  Rather, a country scarred by 
this kind of ‗unthinkable‘ violence is a failed state that has 
interrupted history‘s march; it is a political terra nullius that requires 
external intervention to restore a model of governance that allows its 
people to march forward into history rather than be weighed down by 
primordial conflicts.  This is the backdrop for the dominant terrain of 
human rights work in post-conflict contexts.  This is the threat against 
which human rights and democracy promotion is erecting its armor.   
The production of a country such as Sri Lanka as a conflict zone 
on the international radar screen has many different markers.  Most 
obviously, today it enters the pages of the global media primarily 
through the narrative of war—stories of suicide bombs and aerial 
attacks, militant terrorists and war-mongering politicians.  In 
academia, Sri Lanka became, at various points, the paradigmatic 
reference point for the anthropology of violence,6 the sociology of 
terrorism,7 or political science case studies of conflict resolution and 
 
3. Mahmood Mamdani, Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa, 
IDENTITY, CULTURE AND POL., Dec. 2002, at 1, 5. 
4. Id. at 2. 
5. MICHAEL ONDAATJE, ANIL‘S GHOST 55 (2001). 
6. See Pradeep Jeganathan, ‘Violence’ as an Analytical Problem: Sri Lankanist 
Anthropology After July, ‘83, NĒTHRĀ Q. J., July–Sept. 1998, at 9.  
7. Thus the study of Sri Lanka helps to credentialize a range of ‗noted terrorism experts‘ 
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its failures.8  In the corridors of the U.N., Sri Lanka‘s past 
prominence in policy debates regarding human development indices 
gave way to its reemergence in new discussions regarding human-
itarian emergencies, war crimes, and the responsibility to protect.  
Concomitantly, Sri Lanka was descended on as a field operation for 
conflict-resolution focused NGOs and International NGOs (INGOs).  
International donors began to channel their Sri Lanka funds to 
activities that fall within a peace-building rubric and development 
projects were launched under the auspices of mantras to ‗conflict 
sensitivity.‘  Moreover, struggles over justice and citizenship get 
channeled into the terrain of humanitarianism and human rights as 
these domains garner increasing traction as buttressing efforts to raise 
the barricades against the onslaught of violence.  Across these many 
spheres, Sri Lanka gets interpolated through the echo of battle noise: 
a conflict zone has been produced. 
As violence, or the threat of violence, becomes the meta-narrative 
through which Sri Lanka becomes ‗known,‘ the work of human rights 
takes a form that reflects the long reach of the catastrophic violence 
that birthed the UDHR.  That haunting of the UDHR by the ghosts of 
genocide is recreated every time the UDHR‘s doctrinal, normative, 
and institutional progeny are invoked in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, 
Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and indeed in the numerous contexts 
where violence emerges as the lens through which that country gains 
visibility on the international radar screen.  These are the contexts 
where the international community says that in this bloody 
battleground, at this tragic moment, the human rights framework is 
urgent, necessary, and our only lifeline.   
In haunting human rights in this way, I argue that violence 
performs a ground clearing operation that sanctions a particular 
culture of intervention.  Violence produces contexts of conflict, 
heaving, seething grounds of incendiary clashes where violence over 
determines any intelligible ideological claims or political reference 
 
such as Rohan Gunaratna, Head of the International Center for Political Violence and 
Terrorism Research in Singapore, Peter Chalk, Senior Political Scientist of the RAND 
Corporation in the United States, and Gérard Chaliand, former Director of the European 
Center for the Study of Conflicts in France. 
8. See, e.g., CREATING PEACE IN SRI LANKA: CIVIL WAR AND RECONCILIATION (Robert I. 
Rotberg ed., 1999); Bidisha Biswas, The Challenges of Conflict Management: A Case Study 
of Sri Lanka, 8 CIVIL WARS 46 (2006). 
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points.  In other words, these are ideological terra nullius where 
international intervention is not political in any sense that violates 
sovereignty or democratic self-determination.  Rather, just as the 16
th
 
and 17
th
 century international law doctrine of terra nullius opened 
land peopled only by the ‗savages‘ of yesterday for colonial 
occupation by European powers, the land occupied by violence was 
free for international intervention.  Intervention itself is then rendered 
apolitical and, in fact, like the European occupations of the previous 
centuries, brings regions mired in the still waters of their hellish 
present into historical time and the promise of progress.  The 
legitimacy of intervention is premised on the intertwined ethics and 
pragmatics that are intervention‘s co-travelers; just as colonialism 
would bring land classified as terra nullius into productive use 
recognized by European states, international intervention would draw 
countries overrun with violence into the community of nations so that 
they too can conjoin their futures with a universal progress narrative.  
Such countries are not just failed states,9 but places where there has 
been a failure of norms and standards for the respect of rights and the 
rule of law.  This underscores the urgency to act but it also defines 
the task—namely to institutionalize rescue politics in these tumul-
tuous environments.  This is why human rights and democracy pro-
motion are not about ideology but about humanitarianism.  Just as the 
Red Cross sees itself as offering politically neutral humanitarian aid, 
these international interventions to promote rights, democracy, and 
the rule of law are normative security blankets that help protect and 
heal us from the ravages of mass violence.  The most interesting and 
important dimension of this picture, for the purpose of this paper, is 
less the moral condemnation of the racist or imperial hubris in this 
narrative, but more a tracking of how representation that traffics in 
violence profits the production of legitimacy for intervention.   
III. THE TURN TO EXPERTISE AND ETHICS 
What is the nature of the international intervention that enters the 
post-conflict environment to fight violence?  I would argue that there 
are two dimensions to interventions that are empowered by the 
backdrop of violence that should be highlighted.  The first is the turn 
 
9. ―Failed States‖ is a term of art in the good governance and development literature that 
has very specific indicators regarding economic performance and administrative functions.  
It is used more loosely in the wider conflict/post-conflict literature to refer to states mired in 
long term conflict; this paper refers to the latter, more colloquial usage. 
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to expertise, and the second is the turn to ethics.  If the turn to ethics 
gets manifested in efforts to promote a human rights culture, the turn 
to expertise gets manifested in the professionalization of human 
rights.  The next few pages elaborate on both of these dynamics. 
A. Expertise: The Corporatization of Politics 
In the context of mass violence, much of the focus of international 
intervention has been on developing expertise in the science of 
transition that would engender a political order that respects rights 
and promotes democracy.  The project is seen as a pragmatic and 
non-political effort to fight the turbulence of violent conflict through 
the promise of a democratic order that is a prequel to democratic 
politics.  As one commentator puts it, ―[t]he idea of transitional 
governance may be seen as a pragmatic stepping-stone in a 
democracy-building process.‖10  Thus the field itself has developed 
best practices, good governance models, and methodologies for 
implementation.11  It has indicia of success that establish objective 
benchmarks and target criteria.12  Good governance in relation to the 
body politic is modeled on the domain of assessment that is the 
habitus of corporate governance.13   
Another dimension of this trajectory is that democracy promotion 
becomes a matter pertaining to the science of politics rather than 
politics itself; Bhuta situates this as a deeply modern ―machine 
 
10. Naazneen H. Barma, Brokered Democracy-Building: Developing Democracy 
Through Transitional Governance in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, 8 INT‘L J. ON 
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 127, 127, 139 (2006), available at http://www.unesco.org/shs/ 
ijms/vol8/issue2/art1 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
11. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Governance for Sustainable Human Development, at 2–3 
(1997), available at http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/undp/governance/undppolicy 
doc97-e.pdf. 
12. Linz and Stepan describe the indices as follows: 1) behaviorally, when no significant 
actors attempt to create a nondemocratic regime or turn to violence or secession; 2) 
attitudinally, when a strong majority of public opinion believes that democratic procedures 
and institutions are the best way to govern their collective life; and 3) constitutionally, when 
governmental and non-governmental forces alike are subjected to and habituated to conflict 
resolution within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions laid out by the new 
democratic process.  Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996, at 14.  This is a great example of what Nehal Bhuta calls an 
―Archimedean Law-Giver‖ in Against State-Building, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 517, 518 (2008).   
13. To the point where even the incentive structure for leadership models itself on 
corporate bonuses; thus, over the last few years a fund has been established to make dollar 
payouts to African leaders who transfer power and resist corruption. 
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dream‖ that embodies what Hans Morgenthau found to be ―a defining 
characteristic of modern liberalism.‖14  Bhuta quotes Morgenthau‘s 
1940 lecture at the New School for Social Research situating this as 
the trajectory of a ―political philosophy‖ born out of the conviction 
that it ―was justified in light of reason and was, therefore, beyond the 
reach of historical change . . . .‖15  What this leads to, for Morgen-
thau, is the dangerous and self-deceiving understanding of politics as 
technology, a mode of political being that forgets its own historical 
determinacy and engages with all politics, everywhere, as if political 
and social spaces were homogeneous.16  From the domain of 
economics to the domain of law, this vision gets augmented when 
exported; empowered by the backdrop of violence, it gets augmented 
further when exported to post-conflict contexts; cleansed of any 
historical reminders of path dependence, it gets exported as formula. 
The dominant voice of human rights promotion in post-conflict 
environments is the voice of expertise, and if there is a dominant 
culture, it is the culture of technocratic state craft that Bhuta describes 
so powerfully.  Thus, different kinds of rights are accompanied by 
different subfields of what we may term ‗rights technocrats‘ who 
have expertise on the relevant legal doctrines and best policy 
practices—the best labs where these questions have been worked out 
under different conditions.  Thus across a spectrum of issues there 
science has been channeled into a mobile industry of professionalized 
global expertise that can then be exported to new markets.  We are 
steered to Germany for models on proportionate representation and 
multi-party democracy, to Canada or Switzerland for case studies on 
federalism, to South Africa for transitional justice processes, to 
Northern Ireland for police reform initiatives and so on.  Thus 
international engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process involved 
field trips to ‗model countries‘ to study the best formulas for 
federalism, language policy, transitional justice and institutional 
reform.  In fact, Sri Lanka is not alone.  For instance, across the 
 
14. Bhuta, supra note 12.  Bhuta notes, id. at 535 n.7, that he takes the phrase ―machine 
dream‖ from Philip Mirowski‘s book on the history and epistemology of economics, PHILIP 
MIROWSKI, MACHINE DREAMS: ECONOMICS BECOMES A CYBORG SCIENCE (2002). 
15. Bhuta, supra note 12, at 519 (quoting HANS J. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN 
VERSUS POWER POLITICS 3 (Midway prtg. 1974) (1946)). 
16. As will be seen infra, this envisioning of political space as Euclidean and 
homogeneous was an essential characteristic of both liberal justifications of empire, and is a 
necessary presumption of more contemporary theories of modernization, rational choice and 
institutional design. 
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world, local elites from dozens of countries deemed as ‗conflict 
zones‘ have been shipped out to Canada or Switzerland to study 
federalism and concomitantly experts from these countries have then 
visited conflict environments and convene seminars on rights 
promotion, develop draft constitutions, and clarify appropriate 
international norms and standards for entrenching minority rights 
provisions through a federal framework.  Pluralism here is not about 
politics, but about knowledge.   
Significantly, this is not an old fashioned clunker of an industry 
that is exporting a single ready-made model.  Rather it has an agility 
that accompanies its mobility, a theory of the ‗social‘ that 
accompanies its‘ science.17  Thus the project of reproducing a variant 
of these constitutions in a country like Sri Lanka becomes a project of 
translation, adding a local accent that ‗vernacularizes‘ expert know-
ledge.18  A generation ago, many post-colonial critics were urging 
greater focus on ―the local‖ or lamenting formulaic rule of law 
projects that disregarded context.  Today, there are few contexts 
where international intervention is not already foregrounding the 
local.  In this sense ‗the machine dream‘ has been tweaked with local 
color.  From the U.N. to INGOs, there is widespread reference to the 
importance of folding local context and customary law into these 
nation-building efforts for rights and democracy promotion projects 
to be sustainable.  Attention to local context in ―getting the law right‖  
becomes a critical ―part of helping rebuild the State,‖ according to the 
United Nations Development Program‘s Rule of Law Team Leader 
Sue Tatten in discussing interventions in Sudan.19  She says: 
 
17. Kerry Rittich notes that attention to the ‗social‘ has become appropriated in dominant 
approaches to rule of law development by institutions such as the World Bank.  Kerry 
Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the 
Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 199, 227 (2004). 
18. The language of ‗vernacularizing‘ human rights was introduced by Sally Merry to 
argue that human rights are never exported without being transformed by local struggles.  
See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: The Ka Ho’ 
okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli Tribunal, Hawai’i, 1993, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND 
CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 28 (Richard A. Wilson ed. 1997).  The term 
‗vernacularization‘ evocatively captured how the human rights framework travelled.  Merry 
saw this as a positive process of local appropriation that pluralizes the trajectories that 
emanate from the Universal Declaration.  However, it can also be a process of appropriation 
of the local, of ‗going native‘ in ways that advances the hegemony of the rights framework 
over all alternative discourses of justice. 
19. United Nations Development Programme Newsroom, New Seeds of Justice Sown in 
Southern Sudan (June 14, 2007), http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2007/june/new-seeds-
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―[p]eople need to know that they will be able to resolve their disputes 
in a way that‘s impartial and equitable according to Southern 
Sudanese standards.‖20  In the case of Sudan, the UNDP decides that 
‗vernacularizing state building means keeping both options open, the 
formal court system and the customary law courts, but adapting the 
way the latter works so that it is in line with constitutional principles 
and protects human rights.  In other words, the invocation of the local 
is not a counter to the regime of best practices and universal 
standards, but one that gets seamlessly folded into that regime.21  The 
most important issue here is not the extent to which local knowledge 
or interests are incorporated, but about how the project of ‗going 
native‘ becomes assimilated into what Bhuta describes as ―the 
Archimedean law-giver,‖ as the authoritative figure in relation to any 
of these constitutional projects.22 
Democracy itself emerges as a matter of expertise regarding the 
management of state institutions and political processes in ways that 
can overshadow any focus on the dynamic of political interests and 
choices regarding resources and ideologies.  In fact, in some cases, 
this authorizes a foundational and arbitrative role for professional 
expertise regarding the architecture of rights-promoting societies that 
can argue for the delimiting of democracy itself.  For instance, the 
international community debated how election rules in Afghanistan 
should be shaped in order to prohibit the Taliban from running for 
elected office.  In Gaza, the democratic elections that saw Hamas 
emerge as the people‘s choice was seen to have produced results that 
were inimical to the management of political order and rights 
promotion.  This position was not advanced as ideological opposition 
to Hamas; rather, it was the judgment of experts in rights and 
 
of-justice-sown-in-southern-sudan.en (last visited March 24, 2009). 
20. Id.  
21. Clearly, even those who see rule of law and rights promotion in the most technical 
terms also have a discourse about ‗vernacularizing‘ their interventions and are keen to 
incorporate a consumable package of ‗culture‘ as part of the check-list of technical elements 
needed to advance rule of law projects.  For instance, Rosa Brooks, a Georgetown human 
rights lawyer involved in rule of law projects in Iraq, applauds military JAG officers in Iraq 
―speaking fluent Arabic,‖ saying that that one ―lesson‖ to keep in mind is that we should 
―[k]now the culture and the language well.‖  Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Panel 1: Establishing 
the Rule of Law, 33 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 119, 134 (2004).  Describing the enormity of the 
challenge, she notes that ―building the rule of law in post-conflict societies is . . . much 
harder than getting those rovers up to Mars, because you are dealing with human beings and 
not machines.‖ ‗Culture‘ is needed to grease the wheels of ‗the machine dream.‘  Id. at 133. 
22. Bhuta, supra note 12, at 518. 
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democracy.   
My interest in this context is not the specificities of global Israeli-
Palestinian politics, but the power of the discourse of expertise in 
democratic rights in authorizing some democratic choices and 
delegitimating others.  The modality of political thinking promoted 
here has been described by Wendy Brown as a ―neo-liberal political 
rationality, a rationality that exceeds particular positions on particular 
issues.‖23  As Brown notes, this is not just about the market—in fact 
the economy may not even be the primary focus24—but about 
―extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and 
social actions.‖25  In that sense it is not contradictory for the rights 
and democracy promotion regime to oppose the results of democratic 
decision making in Gaza.  This is a discourse grounded in a notion of 
political rationality that is embedded in specific models of political 
order so that some political choices (such as those of the Gaza 
population in electing Hamas) can be seen as objectively irrational.  
Rights and democracy promotion is about the tutelage of post-
conflict citizens to create ownership of the background rules that will 
allow ‗rational‘ choices, and discourage ‗irrational‘ ones.  It is in this 
sense that Brown notes that neo-liberal political rationality can defeat 
liberal democracy.  The political subjectivity engendered by the 
rights and democracy promotion interventions is one that exercises 
neo-liberal rationality rather than one that is open to a multiplicity of 
political rationalities. 
The authoritative role of rights and democracy promotion 
initiatives in shaping the architecture of political life is not unrelated 
to the political economy of the post-conflict industry.  In keeping 
with trends over the last decade, budget figures for the last year show 
that ―democratic governance remains the largest priority area,‖ 
accounting for over 40% of ―UNDP‘s overall expenditures.‖26  The 
UNDP is not alone on this—rights and democracy promotion is a 
 
23. WENDY BROWN, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORK: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 37, 37 (2005). 
24. Although in some cases the ‗market‘ orientation of political decision may be 
precisely the test for the rationality of the choices made.  For example, advancing a political 
rationality that knits neo-liberal market choices to progress, the U.S. State Department was 
also ambivalent or even hostile to democratic elections in Bolivia and Venezuela. 
25. BROWN, supra note 23, at 40. 
26. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ANNUAL REPORT 2007: MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK FOR 
ALL 20–27 (2007), http://www.undp.org/publications/annualreport2007/IAR07-ENG.pdf. 
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policy and budgetary priority for the wider donor community.  It is 
also a priority for institutions such as the World Bank that were not 
perceived to have a mandate that is directly focused on political 
systems as such, but nevertheless see rights promotion as an integral 
part of the development project in post-conflict environments.   
Moreover, some elements of the international human rights regime 
such as the right to property are seen as particularly important in 
advancing the rule of law and development.  For instance, the 
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, co-chaired by Mary 
Robinson, Hernando De Soto, and Madeline Albright, has been 
urging the human rights community to do more in advancing 
universal property rights as a critical inheritance of the UDHR.27  
Influenced by De Soto and like-minded economists, the World Bank 
has been urging Sri Lanka to advance universal property rights by 
taking the legislative steps necessary to grant property rights to small 
farmers in Sri Lanka.  Significantly, the World Bank first made the 
proposal in 1996, but it took full flower and got translated into draft 
legislation only in the context of the peace process six years later, 
when it took root within the wider framework of nation building and 
post-conflict development.  The context of ‗transition‘ heralded by 
the peace process lubricated many of the Bank-sponsored reforms in 
the name of nation building.  The Sri Lankan peace process is not 
atypical here in the doors it opens to pro-market reforms in the name 
of poverty alleviation and human rights.  For instance, seeking to 
address a variety of post-conflict contexts, a Danish Foreign Ministry 
paper urges that there is a ―correlation between conflict and poverty 
and their integral link to human rights performance‖ in urging 
interventions that go beyond the traditional human rights focus on 
abuses suffered by civilians to treat these contexts as ―fragile states‖ 
that require ―reconstruction.‖28  Seeking to marry ethics and exper-
tise, the paper urges ―a meta-analysis of human rights data across 
fragile states to identify strategic and tactical factors relevant to 
nation building.‖29  Thus from South Africa to Iraq, De Soto‘s 
proposals for property rights have gained traction with the World 
 
27. See, e.g., Mary Robinson, Taking Stock of the Human Rights Agenda 60 Years On, 
24 MD. J. INT‘L L. 1, 6 (2009). 
28. Derek G. Evans, Human Rights and State Fragility 3 (Mar. 2008), available at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/PPPG/politics_and_governance/publications/HRFS_Evans_frame 
work_paper.pdf. 
29. Id. 
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Bank and other international actors in the wake of ‗transitions‘ and 
nation-building efforts that take place against the backdrop of 
violence and the foregrounding of human rights.   
Interestingly the groups targeted by the property rights initiative 
such as the agricultural workers who are part of the Sri Lankan 
Movement for National Land and Agricultural Reform or the South 
African shack dweller‘s organization, Abahlali baseMjondolo have 
opposed initiatives to grant full property rights, arguing that the right 
to alienate property would soon lead to dispossession, given the 
context of large-scale debt and wide socio-economic disparities.30  
Even when gift wrapped with the UDHR, these groups see that short 
term ownership will inevitably lead to long term alienation; thus the 
extension of rights emerges for them as part of the hegemonic order 
rather than a counter-hegemonic initiative.  In contexts of deep 
inequality these groups see the right to full title leading to 
commodification and dispossession.  Yet from the stand point of the 
new market oriented rationality that these transitional reconstruction 
projects are seeking to engender, perhaps the perspective of these 
agricultural workers and squatters reflects a subjectivity produced by 
a still stunted modernity.  It is a perspective that stands in tension 
with the rule of law and rights promotion effort.  One U.S. State 
Department official describes the work of rights and democracy 
promotion as creating subjects who will make different kinds of 
choices about the very fabric of their society.31  From international 
civil society initiatives, such as the Robinson-de Soto commission, to 
multi-lateral institutions such as the World Bank, to donor countries 
such as the U.S., there are a range of international efforts promoting 
rights and democracy as integral to goals such as development or 
peace.  In this landscape, human rights are embedded into a sweeping 
political rationality that is hegemonic rather than embattled, the 
discourse of management, not resistance. 
B. Ethics: The Pre-emption of the Political 
The turn to ethics is distinct from the turn to ‗expertise‘ but it may 
function in ways that are complementary in the post-conflict context.  
 
30. See Vasuki Nesiah & Nanthikesan, Betting on Dispossession, LINES, Aug. 2003, 
http://www.lines-magazine.org/Art_Aug03/Vasuki.htm. 
31. Bhuta, supra note 12. 
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By ―ethics‖ I refer to international initiatives invested in the 
advancement of norms of victim-centered human rights against the 
backdrop of genocide, war, and conflict.  Human rights are not just a 
discourse of law and rules; alongside the discourse of instrumental 
rationality, highlighted in the discussion of expertise, is a discourse 
that speaks of global moral responsibility.  The backdrop of genocide 
has been invoked from Sudan to Cambodia to urge international 
action to protect victims and provide redress.   
In recent years, explicit invocations of the ethical in international 
political discourse in U.N. corridors, NGO workshops, national 
policy initiatives, and such has spawned a range of different 
initiatives (from the international ad hoc tribunals to the Res-
ponsibility to Protect) that have been advanced in the name of an 
ethical imperative to act.  This has had a directly regulative arm that 
has pulled different countries into courtroom dramas and military 
interventions in pursuit of those guilty of violence.  It has also had an 
indirectly regulative reach through a plethora of initiatives aimed at 
norm diffusion, hoping to develop a culture of rights and democracy 
that will trump a culture of violence.  The focus on building a liberal 
culture in post-conflict environments has many dimensions, but I 
would like to highlight two dominant platforms that are wrapped in 
the turn to ethics talk: firstly the liberal peace thesis, and secondly the 
discourse on women as victims of war. 
The ethical vision of the liberal peace thesis that is dominant in the 
post-conflict human rights and peace-building literature is the 
argument that peace (both international and domestic) is promoted, 
and civil war averted, with an embrace of liberal democracy.32  The 
overarching model of rights and pluralism that has been advanced by 
international actors in relation to the Sri Lankan peace process 
reflects two dominant characteristics of rights promotion discourse 
within this framework.  Loosely grouped, these include a juridical–
political discourse of multi-ethnic citizenship and minority rights on 
the one hand,33 and a normative and public policy foundation for 
tolerance, conflict resolution, and co-existence on the other.34  The 
 
32. See R. J. Rummel, Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder, 39 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 3 (1995). 
33. Thus, as noted earlier, much of the intervention has been focused on bringing in 
constitutional expertise from outside and taking political leaders to Canada and Switzerland 
on pluralism field trips.   
34. For instance, many of the initiatives in this context were aimed at bringing together 
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promise is that norms injected through liberal constitutionalism and 
married to liberal pluralism in the public sphere can establish 
institutions that promote and protect tolerance and engender 
interethnic reconciliation.  As Turner argues, ―[l]iberal peace assump-
tions litter the policy documents of the UN, the international financial 
institutions and Western governments‖ in ways that have justified a 
range of interventions to promote liberalism, from diplomacy to 
sanctions and military intervention.35  Within this framework, mass 
violence operates as a free-floating signifier that cleanses inter-
national intervention of any political implications for the distribution 
of resources.  Staging intervention on a tableau of human rights 
makes it part of a universal progress narrative.  Here intervention is 
merely the responsibility to act; it is the heeding of the ethical call.  
As Spivak notes, here the ―idea of human rights . . . may carry within 
it a kind of Social Darwinism: the fittest must shoulder the burden of 
righting the wrongs of the unfit‖ such that ―the breaking of the new 
nations‖ can be conducted ―in the name of their breaking-in into the 
international community of nations.‖36 
The ethical turn within post-conflict interventions cannot be 
reduced to an imperialist impulse; in fact, the field itself may be 
driven by largely altruistic impulses—be they at the individual level37 
or at the level of political institutions and dynamics of the 
international community.  However, the ethical turn captured in the 
embrace of the liberal peace thesis may be premised on assumptions 
regarding rights and collective identities under electoral democracy 
that are fundamentally mistaken.  For instance, translating a peace 
process into a human rights framework may entrench essentialized 
identities and simplify social relations.  Sieder and Witchell argue 
that this was the impact of the Guatemalan peace process on Mayan 
 
different groups of people from the South and the North; from workshops for women 
entrepreneurs from the North and South, to interfaith dialogues amongst Sri Lanka‘s 
religious leaders, the effort was to build the associative ties that engender solidarities within 
a liberal normative habitus.   
35. Mandy Turner, Building Democracy in Palestine: Liberal Peace Theory and the 
Election of Hamas, 13 DEMOCRATIZATION 739, 742 (2006). 
36. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Righting Wrongs, in HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS 
164, 169, 171 (Nicholas Owen ed., 2003). 
37. As David Kennedy notes, many human rights practitioners may seek to ―do well 
while doing good.‖  David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 101 (2002). 
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justice claims; it superimposed a normative framework and an 
institutional process that channeled those claims (through ‗human 
rights‘ idioms such as multiculturalism) in ways that transformed 
them.38  In some cases this process made them more vulnerable to 
abuse by powerful social groups because the concerns that became 
entrenched in the peace process and attendant rule of projects do not 
respond to local power relations, and even distracted from struggles 
that would have addressed and challenged those social structures.39   
Peace processes can subscribe to the myth of neutral constitutions 
and electoral arrangements and occlude their impact on distribution 
and social hierarchy.  For instance, in the Sri Lankan context, periods 
of violence and civil war were not just a ―random time-capsule‖ or 
unexpected ―tectonic slips;‖ rather, there were several ideological or 
material features of the preceding periods of ―normal‖ politics that 
enabled that ―slip.‖  One of the ideological blinders that occluded the 
visibility of those enabling conditions was the humanist myth of 
violence as wholly ‗other‘ to the domain of ‗normal‘ liberal politics.  
Coming to terms with the specific scars and tears of the civil war 
requires that we trace back through history to identify the 
characteristics of ―normal‖ politics that were enabling conditions of 
violence and unpack received mythologies about a previous era when 
Sri Lanka was touted as a ―model democracy.‖  That was not an era 
of ethical innocence but years where violence was contained only to 
fester, derailed only to be deferred; normal politics was characterized 
by constitutionalized anti-minority discrimination.  Rather than 
electoral democracy functioning to halt majoritarianism, the ballot 
box amplified the arithmetic reach of tyranny by the majority.40  
Violence may well emerge as the repressed underside of the electoral 
logic.  This is not an argument against liberal democracy but merely 
the argument that an easy discourse of communal harmony and 
 
38. See Rachel Sieder & Jessica Witchell, Advancing Indigenous Claims Through Law: 
Reflections on the Guatemalan Peace Process, in CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 201 (Jane K. Cowan et. al. eds., 2001). 
39. Id. 
40. For instance, David Scott notes that the Donoughmore Constitution rejected an 
ethnically structured electoral system as fuelling moribund communal solidarities and 
instead opted for the ‗unencumbered‘ vote that would operate on the ostensibly neutral 
arithmetic of electoral majorities and minorities.  Thus it naturalized the logic of ‗number‘ in 
ways that, in effect, rewarded numerical majorities as being on the side of rationality, 
progress, and democratic modernity.  Ironically, however, this became the very enabling 
condition of majoritarianism discussed by David Scott in REFASHIONING FUTURES: CRITICISM 
AFTER POSTCOLONIALITY (1999). 
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reconciliation contained by the liberal peace thesis can generate a 
dangerous amnesia regarding the deprivations and exclusions that 
catalyzed political alienation and militarism in the first place. 
The ‗ethical turn‘ in post-conflict interventions is also char-
acterized by a potentially problematic discourse on victims and 
perpetrators.  For instance, one prominent dimension of ‗ethics talk‘ 
focusing on conflict victims is the production of women as victims, 
as captured in the 2008 passage of Security Council Resolution 1820 
on Sexual Violence.41  Amongst other concerns, the particular focus 
on sexual violence and the restriction of women‘s subjectivity in 
conflict to bodies that have suffered that injury42 privileges bodily 
integrity injuries such as sexual violence, rather than any more 
complex socio-political analysis of these conflicts.  Only the meta-
narrative of victimhood has brought women onto the international 
post-conflict radar screen and allowed them to participate in the 
‗promise‘ of the international law and policy interventions of 
tribunals and Security Council resolutions.  This may provide a 
classic instance of Wendy Brown‘s analysis of ‗wounded attach-
ments.‘43  As Brown notes, investment in an identity of injury can 
curb our political imagination and limits our ability to stake out more 
transformative political claims.  Rather than engagements that 
subvert the naturalized priorities of post-conflict justice, the victim 
paradigm seeks inclusion within its framework.  Rather than expose 
the biases inherent in universalized thresholds of ―shock the 
conscience‖ international crime, it seeks representation of sexual 
crimes within that pantheon of privileged rights violations.  Thus 
when Ban ki-Moon ―announced plans to shortly appoint a Messenger 
of Peace tasked entirely with advocacy for ending violence against 
women,‖44 we should see the ―entirely‖ as a description of the limit of 
victim politics, rather than an expansive recognition of its 
 
41. For a more extended discussion, see VASUKI NESIAH, 1325 AND A NUMBER OF 
UNCOMFORTABLE ALLIANCES IN SOUTH ASIAN FEMINISMS (forthcoming) (on file with 
author). 
42. For instance, when the Category One crimes of the post-genocide trials in Rwanda 
classify rape in the same ‗box‘ as murder—it may actually accentuate women‘s experience 
of victimization from rape as a fate equivalent to death.   
43. See Wendy Brown, Wounded Attachments, 21 POL. THEORY 390 (1993). 
44. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands Immediate and 
Complete Halt to Acts of Sexual Violence Against Civilians in Conflict Zones, Unanimously 
Adopting Resolution 1820, U.N. Doc. SC/9364 (June 19, 2008) (emphasis added). 
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significance.  More generally, the mobilization of the victim–
perpetrator dichotomy that is so crucial to dominant approaches to 
transitional justice simplifies complex histories where victims can 
also be perpetrators.45  Relatedly, as Mamdani has argued in the 
context of apartheid South Africa, the relationship between victims 
and beneficiaries of human rights violations may provide us a better 
map to the histories of atrocity that post-conflict societies need to 
confront.46 
The preceding discussion has highlighted the liberal peace thesis 
and the discourse on women‘s victimization as some of the dominant 
accompaniments to the ethical turn in international post-conflict 
interventions.  Taking a step back, we should also look more 
fundamentally at the work done by this turn to ethics talk in the first 
place.  What does it mean to contest violence through a call to the 
international community‘s ethical responsibilities?  We need to 
examine how human rights and democracy promotion initiatives 
depict the terrain that justifies their intervention.  For instance, 
invoking U.N.-speak for describing ―the tectonic slips and brutal 
human violence‖ of these environments, one author describes ―post-
conflict countries‖ as ―the least favorable environments in which 
democracy can take hold and flourish . . . home to populations with 
sociopolitical cleavages that have led to and become hardened by 
violent civil conflict.‖47  This is the cue for the international com-
munity to enter bearing rights, with the ghost of genocide looking 
over its shoulder, to seed the democratic promise.  Thus, the author 
goes on to say: ―[y]et the international community, led by the UN, 
acts on the belief that a democratic political system is best suited to 
managing political conflict and presumes to be able to build 
democratic institutions in these post-conflict countries.‖48  The 
framing of human rights through the foregrounding of this backdrop 
of violence shapes post-conflict interventions as the indispensable, 
politically neutral ingredient to engage with, and overcome, 
incendiary violence and its accompanying brutalities.  Socio-political 
 
45. See, for example, Mamdani‘s elaboration of the historical processes in relation to the 
Rwandan genocide in MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: 
COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2002). 
46. See Mahmood Mamdani, Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 32 DIACRITICS 33 (2002). 
47. Barma, supra note 10, at 128.   
48. Id. 
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interests are removed from both ends of this story—violence is seen 
to over-determine politics in the contexts of intervention, while the 
discourses of human rights over-determine the politics of the 
intervention.   
It is worth noting that this is not merely a discourse of 
contemporary human rights practice, but even more significantly the 
broader script within which the UDHR emerges as a driving force of 
history.  Analyzing the Declaration‘s effort to condemn, police, and 
prohibit cruelty, Talal Asad notes that it is a founding premise of the 
modernist conception of the human that ―the extension of rights‖ is 
―crucial for the elimination of cruelty.‖49  The post-conflict environ-
ment is not political in any way that is not reducible to the cruelties of 
uncontrolled violence; therefore, international interventions in the 
name of rights that combat violence are by definition legitimate.  It 
may be our norms pitted against their practices,50 but, following 
Asad, we also note that the story of the Universal Declaration is both 
a story of what it means to be human and a story about the 
progressive prohibition of the inhuman.51  By representing politics in 
the environment in which it intervenes as another dimension of 
inhuman violence, the whole field is evacuated of the usual reference 
points of sovereignty or self-determination that would otherwise 
frame our analysis of international intervention.  Instead these ethical 
wrappings deter critique and defer to the promise of progress. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Some see the current phase of international intervention in post-
conflict environments as simply the new phase of a long tradition 
going from colonial governance to the mandate system to 
contemporary territorial administration.  However, today the ‗inter-
national‘ is peopled not by colonizers in the old model but the U.N., 
INGOs, donor governments, and local elites.  While, undoubtedly, 
‗empire‘ plays a role in the geo-political imperatives and enabling 
conditions of these interventions, we cannot reduce these inter-
 
49. Talal Asad, On Torture, or Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS, CULTURE AND CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 111, 112 (Richard A. 
Wilson ed., 1997). 
50. See WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY 
AND EMPIRE (2006). 
51. Asad, supra note 49, at 111. 
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ventions to manifestations of ‗empire‘ anymore than we can reduce 
the UDHR to an updated version of the charter of the British East 
Indian Company.  From Sri Lanka to Zimbabwe, political leaders 
have invoked colonialism and protested invocations of human rights 
as means of defending their abuse of power and running interference 
with transnational solidarities that may reflect the UDHR‘s best 
promise.  Undoubtedly, the UDHR has provided an important 
touchstone for many disenfranchised communities seeking a signpost 
or shield in the struggle for justice in the context of war and civil 
conflict.  Without diminishing that legacy, this paper has sought to 
highlight the underside of mobilizing UDHR‘s humanist promise to 
depict the terrain of violence.  Intervening in a context where there 
will be many celebrations of UDHR‘s positive legacy, this paper has 
sought to follow a more neglected line of inquiry by tracking how the 
representation of violence by human rights, rule of law, and 
democracy promotion initiatives fuels a new currency for 
intervention that may generate a more troubling yield. 
Mobilizing the representations of violence and cruelty is not 
without antecedents in other spaces and places in ways that aim 
towards different ends but with parallel dynamics.  For instance, 
representations of Peruvian indigenous communities as marked by 
violence, cannibalism, and terror functioned as a ―phantasmic social 
force‖ enabling structures of domination that were invoked by the 
Europeans in forcing the Putumayo region into commodity 
production.52  More contemporaneously, the depiction of the urban 
ghetto as marked by ―crime, pathology, and moral decay‖ has been 
an enabling factor in empowering the state to deploy a violent police 
presence and heightened criminalization of the everyday.53  Whether 
in these contexts, or in the post-conflict environments with which this 
paper has been preoccupied, the ―iconography of evil . . . is 
indissolubly welded to images of paradise and the good,‖54 which, in 
our case, is the extended arc of rights, rule of law, and democracy  
 
52. See MICHAEL TAUSSIG, SHAMANISM, COLONIALISM, AND THE WILD MAN: A STUDY IN 
TERROR AND HEALING (1987). 
53. See Henry A. Giroux, Racism and the Aesthetic of Hyper-real Violence: Pulp Fiction 
and Other Visual Tragedies, 1 SOC. IDENTITIES 333 (1995), available at http://archive.freire. 
mcgill.ca/385/1/racism_and_the_aesthetic_of_hyper-real_violence.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 
2009). 
54. I borrow my language from Taussig to highlight the parallel with the way he links 
European depictions of the violence of the other with the celebration of the self.  TAUSSIG, 
supra note 52. 
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that are the progeny of UDHR.  These contrasting representations are 
―indissolubly welded together‖ in making the case for intervention all 
the more urgent and the promise of redemption all the more salutary.  
At the same time, our understanding of their structural links is 
sundered so that the discourse of violence, terror, and failed states 
generates a structural ―distance and moral privilege‖ that places the 
international community ―outside of the web of violence and social 
responsibility.‖55  And so the story goes—if not for the intervention 
of the post-conflict industry, things fall apart. 
 
 
55. Again, I borrow my language from Giroux to highlight the parallel with the way the 
depiction of urban violence helps distance dominant society from its enabling conditions.  
Giroux, supra note 53, at 334. 
